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COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Institutional Options for Managing Rangelands
TIDIANE NGAIDO AND NANCY MCCARTHY
Garret Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” theory uses theexample of rangelands to argue that when many people
have access rights to the same resource, there is a potential
for each individual to overuse and underinvest in the resource.
This theory has prompted a debate over the effectiveness 
of common property resource management, especially for
rangelands.
In reality, rangelands have been subject not just to the
open access situation described by Hardin, but to a wide range
of tenure arrangements, with different structures for regulating
access to, use of, and management of rangelands.These include
many customary and tribal institutional arrangements that have
functioned for long periods. Each of these property rights
regimes and institutional options is associated with different
costs for achieving various goals, such as poverty reduction,
equitable access to resources, and sustainable use and manage-
ment of those resources.This brief considers the benefits and
costs of alternative tenure and institutional arrangements and
the impact of existing legal and policy frameworks on the
sustainability and equity of pastoral production systems under
three categories of landownership: (1) state ownership; (2)
individual ownership; and (3) common property.
STATE OWNERSHIP 
Proponents of state involvement maintain that only an external
authority can enforce the best use of, and investment in,
common pool natural resources.They argue that the state has
greater financial resources with which to make large-scale
investments and can bear the risk associated with such invest-
ments better than community members can. Defining the “best”
use rates and investments, however, requires a good deal of
information on local conditions. In most cases government
agencies responsible for state rangelands have only limited
knowledge of agroecological conditions, and even less under-
standing of local rules of use and management.These informa-
tion problems increase the costs of enforcing management
decisions by government agents. Furthermore, in the arid and
semi-arid regions, flexibility and mobility are valuable strategies
for managing spatial and temporal variation in climate.
Centralized government decisionmaking and enforcement struc-
tures are likely to severely reduce this flexibility. Finally, collective
action is likely to be lower under state tenure because pastoral-
ists may fear that claims on returns to investments they make
now on state land will not be recognized in the future.
Nonetheless, a number of different institutional arrange-
ments have been introduced to manage some of these costs,
including the granting of common use rights to communities or
cooperatives, grazing licenses, and leaseholds.
COMMON USE RIGHTS FOR PASTORAL
COMMUNITIES
Some governments provide tacit recognition of pastoral commu-
nities’ use rights and their potential for informally operating
grazing networks.This tacit recognition, however, gives pastoral-
ists only a limited role in management and investment decisions
and an even smaller role in deciding on the evolution of
property rights. Often users do not have the right to reallocate
common land to alternative activities like cropping or reserves, a
situation that limits the capacity of pastoralists to respond to
local conditions. By appropriating pastoral resources and limiting
the role of local-level pastoral institutions, state ownership has
often fostered land use conflicts and the breakdown of collective
action within and across pastoral groups. In particular, where the
state claimed ownership but expended limited resources to
manage rangelands or relied on bureaucrats to implement
management schemes without knowledge of local resources and
institutions, many land use conflicts have arisen and resources
have become degraded.
COMMON USE RIGHTS FOR PASTORAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Numerous projects have attempted to reorganize pastoralists
into cooperatives with the aim of improving rangeland resources
and promoting collective action, but the cooperatives have rarely
been effective managers of rangelands. In theory, the state and
the local organizations could work together to create and
enforce use rules and investment activities, but in practice the
costs of negotiating such rules have often been prohibitive. In
most West Asian countries pastoral cooperatives have mainly
been involved in distributing subsidized feeds. In Jordan, however,
the new herder-driven cooperatives, which have management
rights granted by the state on their traditional pastures, are
getting better range productivity results than state-managed
reserves, without requiring expensive fencing and guarding.This
type of cooperative fosters collective action between members
because members are certain to reap the benefits of their
investments and control access to improved pastures.There
remain, however, concerns about potential conflicts between
cooperative members and nonmembers. In the Sahel, most of
the pastures exclusively used by members of pastoral organiza-
tions reverted to common pastures open to all community
members at the end of the projects.
GRAZING LICENSES
As part of a strategy designed primarily to reverse rangeland
degradation, government-managed grazing reserves grant grazing
licenses. In the best-case scenario, the government has a well-
defined and well-funded investment strategy. Grazing reserves
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are then opened for grazing during specific periods of the year,
and any herder can buy a license, whether or not he or she is a
member of the tribe or community that held traditional claim to
the reserve area. Pastoral communities contribute little to the
management of these reserves, and the main collective action of
community members has often been to hinder state licensing
policies. In Jordan and Syria, this situation has often led to
conflicts between local and nonlocal herd owners.The approach
has also been widely criticized because of the high costs of
fencing and guarding reserves and the lack of community partici-
pation in improving and managing these reserves.
INDIVIDUAL LEASEHOLDS
The practice of granting long-term individual leaseholds on
range resources remains limited. In Botswana, leaseholds have
in some cases led to increased livestock production and
improved rangeland conditions, but the policy has been
strongly criticized on equity grounds. In many cases, people
with previous claims to resources have been dispossessed or
denied further access without compensation.This situation has
led to additional pressures on the now smaller common pool
resource base, increasing range degradation and leading to
conflicts between large and small herd owners.Widespread
individual leaseholds increase the vulnerability of pastoral
communities during droughts by limiting their capacity to move
and negotiate access to neighboring pastures.There is very
little collective action under this system.
In summary, state ownership often does not promote
community stewardship and thus limits collective action and
incentives for members to manage their resources effectively
and make long-term investments. Competing claims between
pastoral communities and states has created situations of
confusion and open access, leading many pastoralists to
challenge both state and traditional range management rules
and activities and in some cases to illegally appropriate
common rangelands.
INDIVIDUAL OWNERSHIP  
In pastoral areas of central Tunisia, individual private property
rights fostered the transformation of pastoral and nomadic
systems into agropastoralist systems. Privatization led to the
wide-scale adoption of fodder crop production, including cacti
and shrubs.The efficiency of this option, however, depends on
the performance of land, purchased input, credit and output
markets, and legal and institutional provisions to reduce land
fragmentation. Obviously, there is potential for misappropria-
tion of land by the politically powerful, and equity issues are
thus of utmost concern.Also, such a system is likely to reduce
herd size, mobility, and collective action within and between
pastoral groups, and consequently pastoralist households may
become more vulnerable to drought.
COMMON PROPERTY
Common property rights for communities make tenure more
secure, but the communities must bear all costs of making, moni-
toring, and enforcing rules regarding rangeland management.
Managing access to and use of resources can be difficult, particu-
larly when benefits and costs are not equally distributed among
community members. Common property rights are generally
granted to a fixed and well-defined group for rangelands with well-
defined boundaries, thereby limiting flexibility and herd mobility.
Nonetheless, under community ownership, local institutions
may keep their traditional roles of managing the resources,
deciding how to allocate resources between pastures and
croplands, and deciding on the nature of the rights to be
allocated to members and nonmembers.These opportunities
may empower local institutions and provide them with the
capacity to mobilize collection action and sustain the livelihoods
of their communities.
Because landowning communities may have difficulties mobi-
lizing financial resources and technical expertise, they may enter
contractual arrangements for improving their resources. Under
such contracts, as in central Tunisia and Morocco, state institu-
tions, generally forest services, are entrusted with the responsi-
bility for improving and managing the resource. After the
improvement of the resource, rights holders purchase grazing or
cutting licenses, and the revenues generated from the licenses are
used to pay off improvement costs.Theoretically, these ranges will
revert to communities once improvement costs are recuperated;
in practice, however, such transfers have often not taken place.
CONCLUSIONS
Achieving efficient, equitable, and sustainable rangeland manage-
ment depends on the costs and benefits of alternative systems.
These costs and benefits, in turn, depend on agroecological, socio-
cultural, and economic characteristics.The conservation and
management of rangelands require not only tenure security, but
also an understanding of local livestock production and risk
management strategies and factors that promote collective
action, which can then be integrated into national policy formu-
lation strategies and project designs. 
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